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Abstract. We study the issues of existence and inefficiency of pure Nash
equilibria in linear congestion games with altruistic social context, in
the spirit of the model recently proposed by de Keijzer et al. [13]. In
such a framework, given a real matrix Γ = (γij) specifying a particular
social context, each player i aims at optimizing a linear combination
of the payoffs of all the players in the game, where, for each player j,
the multiplicative coefficient is given by the value γij . We give a broad
characterization of the social contexts for which pure Nash equilibria are
always guaranteed to exist and provide tight or almost tight bounds on
their prices of anarchy and stability. In some of the considered cases, our
achievements either improve or extend results previously known in the
literature.
1 Introduction
Congestion games are, perhaps, the most famous class of non-cooperative games
due to their capability to model several interesting competitive scenarios, while
maintaining some nice properties. In these games there is a set of players sharing
a set of resources, where each resource has an associated latency function which
depends on the number of players using it (the so-called congestion). Each player
has an available set of strategies, where each strategy is a non-empty subset of
resources, and aims at choosing a strategy minimizing her cost which is defined
as the sum of the latencies experienced on all the selected resources.
Congestion games have been introduced by Rosenthal [18]. He proved that
each such a game admits a bounded potential function whose set of local min-
ima coincides with the set of pure Nash equilibria of the game, that is, strategy
profiles in which no player can decrease her cost by unilaterally changing her
strategic choice. This existence result makes congestion games particularly ap-
pealing especially in all those applications in which pure Nash equilibria are
elected as the ideal solution concept.
In these contexts, the study of the inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria, usu-
ally measured by the sum of the costs experienced by all players, has affirmed as
a fervent research direction. To this aim, the notions of price of anarchy (Kout-
soupias and Papadimitriou [16]) and price of stability (Anshelevich et al. [2])
are widely adopted. The price of anarchy (resp. stability) compares the perfor-
mance of the worst (resp. best) pure Nash equilibrium with that of an optimal
cooperative solution.
Congestion games with unrestricted latency functions are general enough
to model the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, whose unique pure Nash equilibrium is
known to perform arbitrarily bad with respect to the solution in which all players
cooperate. Hence, in order to deal with significative bounds on the prices of
anarchy and stability, some kind of regularity needs to be imposed on the latency
functions associated with the resources. To this aim, lot of research attention has
been devoted to the case of polynomial latency functions.
In particular, Awerbuch et al. [4] and Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [11]
proved that the price of anarchy of congestion games is 5/2 for linear latency
functions and dΘ(d) for polynomial latency functions of degree d. Subsequently,
Aland et al. [1] obtained exact bounds on the price of anarchy for congestion
games with polynomial latency functions. Still for linear latencies, Caragiannis et
al. [7] proved that the same bounds hold for load balancing games as well, that
is, for the restriction in which all possible strategies are singleton sets, while
for symmetric load balancing games, that is load balancing games in which the
players share the same set of strategies, Lu¨cking et al. [17] proved that the price
of anarchy is 4/3. Moreover, the works of Caragiannis et al. [7] and Christodoulou
and Koutsoupias [12] show that the price of stability of congestion games with
linear latency functions is 1 + 1/
√
3, while an exact characterization for the
case of polynomial latency functions of degree d has been recently given by
Christodoulou and Gairing [10].
Motivations and Previous Related Works. To the best of our knowledge,
Chen and Kempe [9] were the first to study the effects of altruistic (and spite-
ful) behavior on the existence and inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria in some
well-understood non-cooperative games. They focus on the class of non-atomic
congestion games, where there are infinitely many players each contributing for
a negligible amount of congestion, and show that price of anarchy decreases as
the degree of altruism of the players increases.
Hoefer and Skopalik [15] consider (atomic) linear congestion games with γi-
altruistic players, where γi ∈ [0, 1], for each player i. According to their model,
player i aims at minimizing a function defined as 1 − γi times her cost plus γi
times the sum of the costs of all the players in the game (also counting player
i). They show that pure Nash equilibria are always guaranteed to exist via a
potential function argument, while, in all the other cases in which existence is
not guaranteed, they study the complexity of the problem of deciding whether
a pure Nash equilibrium exists in a given game.
Given the existential result by Hoefer and Skopalik [15], Caragiannis et al. [8]
focus on the impact of altruism on the inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria in
linear congestion games with altruistic players. However, they consider a more
general model of altruistic behavior: in fact, for a parameter γi ∈ [0, 1], they
model a γi-altruistic player i as a player who aims at minimizing a function
defined as 1 − γi times her cost plus γi times the sum of the costs of all the
players in the game other than i1. In such a way, the more γi increases, the
more γi-altruistic players tend to favor the interests of the others to their own
ones, with 1-altruistic and 0-altruistic players being the two opposite extremal
situations in which players behave in a completely altruistic or in a completely
selfish way, respectively. Caragiannis et al. [8] consider the basic case of γi = γ
for each player i and show that the price of anarchy is 5−γ2−γ for γ ∈ [0, 1/2] and
2−γ
1−γ for γ ∈ [1/2, 1] and that these bounds hold also for load balancing games.
This result appears quite surprising, because it shows that altruism can only
have a harmful effect on the efficiency of linear congestion games, since the price
of anarchy increases from 5/2 up to an unbounded value as the degree of altruism
goes from 0 to 1. On the positive side, they prove that, for the special case of
symmetric load balancing games, the price of anarchy is 4(1−γ)3−2γ for γ ∈ [0, 1/2]
and 3−2γ4(1−γ) for γ ∈ [1/2, 1], which shows that altruism has a beneficial effect as
long as γ ∈ [0, 0.7]. Note that, that for γ = 1/2, that is when selfishness and
altruism are perfectly balanced, the price of anarchy drops to 1 (i.e., all pure
Nash equilibria correspond to socially optimal solutions), while, as soon as γ
approaches 1, the price of anarchy again grows up to an unbounded value.
Recently, de Keijzer et al. [13] proposed a model for altruistic and spiteful
behavior further generalizing the one of Caragiannis et al. [8]. According to
their definition, each non-cooperative game with n players is coupled with a real
matrix Γ = (γij) ∈ Rn×n, where γij expresses how much player i cares about
player j. In such a framework, player i wants to minimize the sum, for each player
j in the game (thus also counting i), of the cost of player j multiplied by γij .
Thus, a positive (resp. negative) value γij expresses an altruistic (resp. spiteful)
attitude of player i towards player j. When considering linear congestion games
with altruistic players, along the lines of the negative results of Caragiannis
et al. [8], as soon as there are two players i, j such that γij > γii, i.e., player
i cares more about player j than about herself, the price of anarchy becomes
unbounded. Therefore, Keijzer et al. [13] focus on the scenario, which they call
restricted altruistic social context, in which γii ≥ γij for each pair of players i
and j. By extending the smoothness framework of Roughgarden [19], they show
an upper bound of 7 on the price of anarchy of coarse correlated equilibria,
which implies the same upper bound also on the price of anarchy of correlated
equilibria, mixed Nash equilibria and pure Nash equilibria (whenever the latter
exist). Moreover, they prove that, when restricting to load balancing games with
identical resources, such an upper bound decreases to 2 +
√
5 ≈ 4.236.
Noting that matrix Γ implicitly represents the social context (for instance, a
social network) in which the players operate, the model of de Keijzer et al. [13]
falls within the scope of the so-called social context games. In these games, the
1 Note that each game with γi-altruistic players, where γi ∈ [0, 1], in the model of
Hoefer and Skopalik [15] maps to a game with γ′i-altruistic players, where γ
′
i ∈
[0, 1/2], in the model of Caragiannis et al. [8].
payoff of each player is redefined as a function, called aggregating function, of
her cost and of those of her neighbors in a given social context graph.
Social context games have been introduced and studied by Ashlagi, Krysta,
and Tennenholtz [3] for the class of load balancing games, in the case in which
the aggregating function is one among the minimum, maximum, sum and rank-
ing functions, for which they gave an almost complete characterization of the
cases in which existence of pure Nash equilibria is guaranteed. The model of de
Keijzer et al. [13], hence, coincides with a social context game in which the so-
cial context graph has weighted edges and the aggregating function is a weighted
sum. The issues of existence and inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria for the case
of social context linear congestion games have been considered by Bilo` et al. [6].
In particular, for the aggregating function sum, pure Nash equilibria are shown
to exist for each social context graph via an exact potential function argument
and the price of anarchy is shown to fall within the interval [5; 17/3].
Finally, the particular case of social context games in which the social context
graph is a partition into cliques coincide with games in which static coalitions
among players are allowed. These games have been considered by Fotakis, Kon-
togiannis and Spirakis [14] who focus on weighted congestion game defined on a
parallel link graph when the aggregating function is the maximum function (i.e,
the coalitional generalization of the KP-model of Koutsoupias and Papadim-
itriou [16]). Among their findings, they show that such games always admit a
potential function which becomes an exact one in case of linear latency func-
tions (even in the generalization to networks) and that the price of anarchy is
Θ
(
min
{
k, logmlog logm
})
, where m denotes the number of links and k denotes the
number of coalitions.
Our Contribution. We consider the issues of existence and inefficiency of pure
Nash equilibria in linear congestion games with social context as defined by
de Keijzer et al. [13]. In particular, we restrict our attention to the case of
altruistic players, that is, the case in which the matrix Γ has only non-negative
entries. We show that pure Nash equilibria are always guaranteed to exist via
an exact potential function argument, when either the altruistic social context is
restricted and Γ is symmetric. Moreover, we provide instances with three players
not admitting pure Nash equilibria as soon as exactly one of these two properties
is not satisfied.
We then prove that, in the restricted altruistic social context, the price of
anarchy is exactly 17/3. Such a characterization is achieved by providing an
upper bound of 17/3 which holds for any matrix Γ (even the ones for which pure
Nash equilibria are not guaranteed to exist) and a matching lower bound which
holds even in the special case in which Γ is a boolean symmetric matrix and the
game is a load balancing one. Such a result has two interesting interpretations:
first, it shows that either the upper bound of 7 given by de Keijzer et al. [13] for
the price of anarchy of coarse correlated equilibria is not tight, or that the prices
of anarchy of coarse correlated equilibria and pure Nash equilibria are different
(the latter hypothesis would be an interesting one, since this situation does not
happen in linear congestion games with selfish players); secondly, it proves that
the assumption of having identical resources is essential in the upper bound of
2 +
√
5 given by de Keijzer et al. [13] for the case of load balancing games.
For the price of stability in the restricted altruistic social context, we give
an upper bound of 2 holding for each symmetric matrix Γ and a lower bound of
1+1/
√
2 ≈ 1.707 holding for the case in which Γ is a boolean symmetric matrix.
Finally, we also consider the special case in which Γ is such that γij = γi for
each pair of indexes i, j with i 6= j, which coincides with the general model of γi-
altruistic players of Caragiannis et al. [8]. We show that pure Nash equilibria are
always guaranteed to exist in any case via an exact potential function argument
(this slightly improves the existential result by Hoefer and Skopalik [15] since
they only proved the existence of a weighted potential function) and give an
upper bound on the price of anarchy in the general case and an exact bound on
the price of stability when γi = γ for each player i.
2 Preliminaries
A congestion game is a tuple G = 〈[n], E, Si∈[n], ℓe∈E〉, where [n] := {1, . . . , n}
is a set of n ≥ 2 players, E is a set of resources, ∅ 6= Si ⊆ 2E is the set of
strategies of player i, and ℓe : N → R≥0 is the latency function of resource e.
The special case in which, for each i ∈ [n] and each s ∈ Si, it holds |s| = 1
is called load balancing congestion game. Denoted by S := ×i∈[n]Si the set of
strategy profiles in G, that is, the set of outcomes of G in which each player selects
a single strategy, the cost of player i in the strategy profile S = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S
is defined as ci(S) =
∑
e∈si ℓe(ne(S)), where ne(S) := |{j ∈ [n] : e ∈ sj}| is the
congestion of resource e in S, that is, the number of players using e in S.
Given a strategy profile S = (s1, . . . , sn) and a strategy t ∈ Si for a player
i ∈ [n], we denote with S−i ⋄ t the strategy profile obtained from S by replacing
the strategy played by i in S with t. A pure Nash equilibrium is a strategy
profile S such that, for any player i ∈ [n] and for any strategy t ∈ Si, it holds
ci(S−i ⋄ t) ≥ ci(S).
The function SUM : S → R≥0 such that SUM(S) =
∑
i∈[n] ci(S), called
the social function, measures the social welfare of a game. Given a congestion
game G, let NE(G) denote the set of its pure Nash equilibria (such a set has
been shown to be non-empty by Rosenthal [18]) and S∗ be the strategy profile
minimizing the social function. The price of anarchy (PoA) of G is defined as
maxS∈NE(G)
{
SUM(S)
SUM(S∗)
}
, while the price of stability (PoS) of G is defined as
minS∈NE(G)
{
SUM(S)
SUM(S∗)
}
.
A linear congestion game is a congestion game such that, for each e ∈ E, it
holds ℓe(x) = αex + βe, with αe, βe ≥ 0. For these games, the cost of player i
in the strategy profile S = (s1, . . . , sn) becomes ci(S) =
∑
e∈si (αene(S) + βe),
while the social value of S becomes SUM(S) =
∑
i∈[n]
∑
e∈si (αene(S) + βe) =∑
e∈E
(
αene(S)
2 + βene(S)
)
.
A linear congestion game with an altruistic social context is a pair (G, Γ )
such that G is a linear congestion game with n players and Γ = (γij) ∈ Rn×n
is a real matrix such that γij ≥ 0 for each i, j ∈ [n]. The set of play-
ers and strategies is defined as in the underlying linear congestion game G,
while, for any strategy profile S, the cost of player i is S = (s1, . . . , sn)
is defined as ĉi(S) =
∑
j∈[n] (γij · cj(S)) =
∑
j∈[n] (γij (αene(S) + βe)) =∑
e∈E
(
(αene(S) + βe)
∑
j∈[n]:e∈sj γij
)
, where cj(S) is the cost of player j in S
in the underlying linear congestion game G. The special case in which γii ≥ γij
for each i, j ∈ [n], is called restricted altruistic social context. Note that, in such
a case, as pointed out by de Keijzer et al. [13], it is possible to assume without
loss of generality that γii = 1 for each i ∈ [n]2.
3 Existence of Pure Nash Equilibria
In this section, we provide a complete characterization of the social contexts for
which pure Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist, independently of which is
the underlying linear congestion game.
For a strategy profile S = (s1, . . . , sn), a player i ∈ [n] and a strategy t ∈ Si,
for the sake of brevity, let us denote with xe := ne(S) and with x
′
e = ne(S−i ⋄ t).
It holds
ĉi(S)− ĉi(S−i ⋄ t)
=
∑
e∈E
(αexe + βe) ∑
j:e∈sj
γij
−∑
e∈E
(αex′e + βe) ∑
j:e∈sj
γij

=
∑
e∈si\t
(αexe + βe) ∑
j:e∈sj
γij − (αe(xe − 1) + βe)
∑
j 6=i:e∈sj
γij

+
∑
e∈t\si
(αexe + βe) ∑
j:e∈sj
γij − (αe(xe + 1) + βe)
γii + ∑
j:e∈sj
γij

=
∑
e∈si\t
γii (αexe + βe) + αe ∑
j 6=i:e∈sj
γij

−
∑
e∈t\si
γii (αe(xe + 1) + βe) + αe ∑
j:e∈sj
γij
 .
(1)
On the positive side, we show that, for restricted altruistic social contexts
such that Γ is symmetric, pure Nash equilibria do always exist.
2 This claim follows from the fact that both the set of pure Nash equilibria and the
social value of any strategy profile do not change when dividing all the entries in row
i of Γ by the value γii.
Theorem 1. Each linear congestion game with restricted altruistic social con-
text (G, Γ ) such that Γ is symmetric admits an exact potential function.
Proof. For a strategy profile S and a resource e, let Pe(S) = {(i, j) ∈ [n]× [n] :
i 6= j ∧ e ∈ si ∩ sj}. We define the following potential function:
Φ(S) =
1
2
∑
e∈E
αe
ne(S)(ne(S) + 1) + ∑
(i,j)∈Pe(S)
γij
+ 2βene(S)
 .
Consider a strategy profile S = (s1, . . . , sn), a player i ∈ [n] and a strategy t ∈ Si
and again denote with xe := ne(S). For the case in which γii = 1 for each i ∈ [n]
and γij = γji for each i, j ∈ [n], it holds
Φ(S) − Φ(S−i ⋄ t)
=
1
2
∑
e∈si\t
αe
xe(xe + 1) + ∑
(i,j)∈Pe(S)
γij
+ 2βexe

−1
2
∑
e∈si\t
αe
xe(xe − 1) + ∑
(j,k)∈Pe(S):j,k 6=i
γjk
+ 2βe(xe − 1)

+
1
2
∑
e∈t\si
αe
xe(xe + 1) + ∑
(i,j)∈Pe(S)
γij
+ 2βexe

−1
2
∑
e∈t\si
αe
(xe + 1)(xe + 2) + ∑
(j,k)∈Pe(S)
γjk + 2
∑
j:e∈sj
γij
+ 2βe(xe + 1)

=
1
2
∑
e∈si\t
αe
2xe + 2 ∑
j 6=i:e∈sj
γij
+ 2βe

−1
2
∑
e∈t\si
αe
2(xe + 1) + 2 ∑
j:e∈sj
γij
+ 2βe

=
∑
e∈si\t
αe
xe + ∑
j 6=i:e∈sj
γij
+ βe
 − ∑
e∈t\si
αe
xe + 1 + ∑
j:e∈sj
γij
+ βe

which, being equivalent to equation (1), shows that Φ is an exact potential
function for (G, Γ ). ⊓⊔
In order to prove that the characterization given in Theorem 1 is tight, we
provide the following two non-existential results. In the first one, although pre-
serving the property that Γ is symmetric, we relax the constraint that the game
is played in a restricted altruistic social context: in particular, we allow γii = 0
for some player i ∈ [n].
Theorem 2. There exists a three-player linear congestion game G and a sym-
metric matrix Γ ∈ R3×3 such that the linear congestion game with altruistic
social context (G, Γ ) does not admit pure Nash equilibria.
In the second result, although preserving the property that the game is played
in a restricted altruistic social context, we relax the constraint that Γ is sym-
metric.
Theorem 3. There exists a three-player linear congestion game G and a matrix
Γ ∈ R3×3 with a unitary main diagonal such that (G, Γ ) does not admit pure
Nash equilibria.
4 Inefficiency of Pure Nash Equilibria
In this section, we give bounds on the prices of anarchy and stability of linear
congestion games with restricted social context. These bounds are achieved by
applying the primal-dual technique that we introduced in [5]. To this aim, we
recall that it is possible to assume without loss of generality that βe = 0 for
each e ∈ E as long as we are not interested in load balancing games. For a
given linear congestion game with altruistic social context (G, Γ ), we denote
with K = (k1, . . . , kn) and O = (o1, . . . , on), respectively, a Nash equilibrium
and a social optimum of (G, Γ ) and we use Ke := ne(K) and Oe := ne(O) to
denote the congestion of resource e in K and O, respectively.
The primal-dual method aims at formulating the problem of maximizing the
ratio SUM(K)
SUM(O) via linear programming. The two strategy profiles K and O play
the role of fixed constants, while, for each e ∈ E, the values αe defining the
latency functions are variables that must be suitably chosen so as to satisfy two
constraints: the first, assures thatK is a pure Nash equilibrium, while the second
normalizes to 1 the value of the social optimum SUM(O). The objective function
aims at maximizing the social value SUM(K) which, being the social optimum
normalized to 1, is equivalent to maximize the ratio SUM(K)
SUM(O) . Let us denote with
LP (K,O) such a linear program, which, in our scenario of investigation becomes
maximize
∑
e∈E
(
αeK
2
e
)
subject to∑
e∈ki\oi
αe
Ke + ∑
j 6=i:e∈kj
γij

−
∑
e∈oi\ki
αe
Ke + 1 + ∑
j:e∈kj
γij
 ≤ 0, ∀i ∈ [n]∑
e∈E
(
αeO
2
e
)
= 1,
αe ≥ 0, ∀e ∈ E
Let DLP (K,O) be the dual program of LP (K,O). By the Weak Duality The-
orem, each feasible solution to DLP (K,O) provides an upper bound on the
optimal solution of LP (K,O). Hence, by providing a feasible dual solution, we
obtain an upper bound on the ratio SUM(K)
SUM(O) . Anyway, if the provided dual so-
lution is independent on the particular choice of K and O, we obtain an upper
bound on the ratio SUM(K)
SUM(O) for any possible pair of profiles K and O, which
means that we obtain an upper bound on the price of anarchy of pure Nash
equilibria. The dual program DLP (K,O) is
minimize θ
subject to∑
i:e∈ki\oi
yi
Ke + ∑
j 6=i:e∈kj
γij

−
∑
i:e∈oi\ki
yi
Ke + 1 + ∑
j:e∈kj
γij
+ θO2e ≥ K2e , ∀e ∈ E
yi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [n]
Theorem 4. For any linear congestion game with restricted altruistic social
context (G, Γ ), it holds PoA(G, Γ ) ≤ 173 .
Proof. Consider the dual solution such that θ = 17/3 and yi = 5/3 for each
i ∈ [n]. With these values, for each e ∈ E, the dual constraint becomes
5
∑
i:e∈ki\oi
Ke + ∑
j 6=i:e∈kj
γij
− 5 ∑
i:e∈oi\ki
Ke + 1 + ∑
j:e∈kj
γij
+17O2e ≥ 3K2e .
Let ∆e = |{i ∈ [n] : e ∈ ki ∩ oi}|. Since (G, Γ ) is a linear congestion game with
restricted altruistic social context, it holds γij ≤ 1 for each i, j ∈ [n]. Hence, the
dual constraint is obviously verified when it holds
5
∑
i:e∈ki\oi
Ke − 5
∑
i:e∈oi\ki
(2Ke + 1) + 17O
2
e ≥ 3K2e ,
which is equivalent to
5(Ke −∆e)Ke − 5(Oe −∆e) (2Ke + 1) + 17O2e ≥ 3K2e . (2)
It is easy to see that inequality (2) is always true when it holds
5K2e − 5Oe (2Ke + 1) + 17O2e ≥ 3K2e . (3)
To see that inequality (3) is always verified for any pair of non-negative integers
(Ke, Oe), note that the discriminant of its associate equality, when solved for
Ke, is non-positive for any Oe ≥ 2 and that inequality (3) is always verified for
any non-negative values of Ke when Oe ∈ {0, 1}. ⊓⊔
When compared to the upper bound of 7 for the price of anarchy of coarse
correlated equilibria given by de Keijzer et al. [13], our upper bound implies
that either the one for coarse correlated equilibria is not tight, or the prices of
anarchy of coarse correlated equilibria and pure Nash equilibria are different.
Such a latter case would be quite significant since this does not happen in linear
congestion games with selfish players.
We now give a marching lower bound which holds even in the special case
in which Γ is a symmetric boolean matrix and the underlying linear congestion
game is a load balancing one. The basic idea of our construction, suitably ex-
tended to comply with our altruistic scenario, is borrowed from Caragiannis et
al. [7].
Theorem 5. For any ǫ > 0, there exists a linear congestion game with restricted
altruistic social context (G, Γ ), such that G is a load balancing game and Γ is a
symmetric boolean matrix, for which PoA(G, Γ ) ≥ 173 − ǫ.
Note that such a lower bound implies that the the assumption of identical
resources in crucial in the upper bound of 2 +
√
5 given by de Keijzer et al. [13]
for load balancing games with restricted altruistic social context.
We now turn our attention to the study of the price of stability. By exploiting
the potential function defined in the previous section and the fact that there
exists a pure Nash equilibrium K such that Φ(K) ≤ Φ(O), we easily obtain the
following upper bound.
Theorem 6. For any linear congestion game with restricted altruistic social
context (G, Γ ) such that Γ is symmetric, it holds PoS(G, Γ ) ≤ 2.
Proof. Let K be a pure Nash equilibrium obtained after a sequence of improving
deviation starting from O. The existence of K is guaranteed by the existence of
the potential function Φ. Moreover, it holds Φ(K) ≤ Φ(O). Hence, it follows that
SUM(K) =
∑
e∈E
(
αeK
2
e
)
≤
∑
e∈E
αe
Ke(Ke + 1) + ∑
(i,j)∈Pe(K)
γij

= Φ(K)
≤ Φ(O)
=
∑
e∈E
αe
Oe(Oe + 1) + ∑
(i,j)∈Pe(O)
γij

≤
∑
e∈E
(αe (Oe(Oe + 1) +Oe(Oe − 1)))
= 2
∑
e∈E
(
αeO
2
e
)
= 2SUM(O),
where the last inequality follows from the fact that γij ∈ [0, 1] for each i, j ∈ [n]
and |Pe(O)| = Oe(Oe − 1). ⊓⊔
In this case, we are only able to provide a lower bound of 1 + 1√
2
≈ 1.707.
Theorem 7. For any ǫ > 0, there exists a linear congestion game with restricted
altruistic social context (G, Γ ), such that Γ is a symmetric boolean matrix, for
which PoS(G, Γ ) ≥ 1 + 1√
2
− ǫ.
5 Results for Simple Social Contexts
In this section, we focus on the special case given by model of Caragiannis et
al. [8] in which, for each i ∈ [n], it holds γii = 1 − γi and γij = γi for each
j 6= i ∈ [n], where γi ∈ [0, 1]. In such a model, the restricted altruistic social
context coincides with the case in which, for each i ∈ [n], it holds γi ≤ 1/2.
Caragiannis et al. [8] show that, when γi = γ for each i ∈ [n], the price of anarchy
is exactly 2−γ1−γ for general altruistic social contexts and
5−γ
2−γ in the restricted one.
First of all, we prove that pure Nash equilibria are always guaranteed to
exist via an exact potential function argument. An existential result had already
been given by Hoefer and Skopalik [15], nevertheless, their proof makes use
of a weighted potential function. So, our result is slightly stronger and, more
importantly, provides a better potential function to be subsequently exploited
in the derivation of an upper bound on the price of stability of these games.
Let Vn := [0, 1]n be the set of n-dimensional vectors whose entries belong
to the interval [0, 1]. Given a vector V = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Vn, denote with ΓV the
n× n matrix Γ such that, for each i ∈ [n], it holds γii = 1− vi and γij = vi for
each j 6= i ∈ [n].
Theorem 8. Each n-player linear congestion game with altruistic social context
(G, Γ ) such that Γ = ΓV for some V ∈ Vn admits an exact potential function.
Proof. Consider a strategy profile S = (s1, . . . , sn), a player i ∈ [n] and a
strategy t ∈ Si, and again denote with xe := ne(S). From equation (1), since∑
j 6=i:e∈sj γij = (xe − 1)vi and
∑
j:e∈sj γij = xevi, it follows that
ĉi(S)− ĉi(S−i ⋄ t)
=
∑
e∈si\t
(αe (xe − vi) + (1− vi)βe)−
∑
e∈t\si
(αe (xe + 1− vi) + (1− vi)βe) . (4)
Consider, now, the following potential function
Φ(S) =
1
2
∑
e∈E
αe
xe(xe + 1)− 2 ∑
j:e∈sj
vj
+ 2βe ∑
j:e∈sj
(1− vj)
 .
It holds
Φ(S)− Φ(S−i ⋄ t)
=
1
2
∑
e∈si\t
(αe (2xe − 2vi) + 2(1− vi)βe)
−1
2
∑
e∈t\si
(αe (2(xe + 1)− 2vi) + 2(1− vi)βe)
=
∑
e∈si\t
(αe (xe − vi) + (1 − vi)βe)−
∑
e∈t\si
(αe (xe + 1− vi) + (1 − vi)βe)
which shows that Φ is an exact potential function for (G, Γ ). ⊓⊔
By exploiting the potential function defined above, we obtain an upper bound
on the price of stability for the case in which vi = v for each i ∈ [n] as follows.
The fact that there exists a pure Nash equilibrium K such that Φ(K) ≤ Φ(O)
easily implies the following inequality (where, as usual, we have removed the
terms βe from the latency functions):∑
e∈E
(αe (Ke(Ke + 1)− 2vKe −Oe(Oe + 1) + 2vOe)) ≤ 0, (5)
where we have used the equalities
∑
j:e∈kj vj = vKe and
∑
j:e∈oj vj = vOe.
By exploiting the inequality ĉi(K) − ĉi(K−i ⋄ oi) ≤ 0, we obtain that, for
each i ∈ [n], it holds∑
e∈ki\oi
(αe (Ke − v))−
∑
e∈oi\ki
(αe (Ke + 1− v)) ≤ 0,
which implies ∑
e∈ki
(αe (Ke − v))−
∑
e∈oi
(αe (Ke + 1− v)) ≤ 0. (6)
Using both inequalities (5) and (6), the primal formulation LP (K,O) be-
comes the following one.
maximize
∑
e∈E
(
αeK
2
e
)
subject to∑
e∈E
(αe (Ke(Ke + 1)− 2vKe −Oe(Oe + 1) + 2vOe)) ≤ 0∑
e∈ki
(αe (Ke − v))−
∑
e∈oi
(αe (Ke + 1− v)) ≤ 0, ∀i ∈ [n]∑
e∈E
(
αeO
2
e
)
= 1,
αe ≥ 0, ∀e ∈ E
The dual program DLP (K,O) is
minimize θ
subject to
x (Ke(Ke + 1)− 2vKe −Oe(Oe + 1) + 2vOe)
+
∑
i:e∈ki
(yi (Ke − v))−
∑
i:e∈oi
(yi (Ke + 1− v)) + θO2e ≥ K2e , ∀e ∈ E
x ≥ 0,
yi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [n]
Theorem 9. For any n-player linear congestion game with altruistic social
context (G, Γ ) such that Γ = ΓV for some V ∈ Vn with vi = v for each
i ∈ [n], it holds PoS(G, Γ ) ≤ (
√
3+1)(1−v)√
3−v(√3−1) when v ∈ [0, 1/2] and PoS(G, Γ ) ≤
3−√3−2v(2−√3)
2(1−v) when v ∈ [1/2, 1].
We now show matching lower bounds.
Theorem 10. For any ǫ > 0, there exists an n-player linear congestion game
with altruistic social context (G, Γ ) such that Γ = ΓV for some V ∈ Vn with
vi = v ∈ [0, 1/2] for each i ∈ [n] for which it holds PoS(G, Γ ) ≥ (
√
3+1)(1−v)√
3−v(√3−1) − ǫ
and an n-player linear congestion game with altruistic social context (G′, Γ ′)
such that Γ ′ = Γ ′V for some V ∈ Vn with vi = v ∈ [1/2, 1] for each i ∈ [n] for
which it holds PoS(G′, Γ ′) ≥ 3−
√
3−2v(2−√3)
2(1−v) − ǫ.
Note that for v = 1/2, the price of stability is 1 which means that, when
players are half selfish and half altruistic, there always exists a social optimal
solution which is also a pure Nash equilibrium. For v = 0, that is, when players
are totally selfish, we reobtain the well-known bound of 1 + 1/
√
3 on the price
of stability of linear congestion games proven by Caragiannis et al. [7]. For v =
1, the price of stability goes to infinity, i.e., all Nash equilibria may perform
extremely bad with respect to the social optimal solution. This implies that
totally altruistic players are tremendously harmful in a non-cooperative system,
since they yield games in which even the price of stability may be unbounded.
Finally, in the restricted altruistic social context, i.e. v ∈ [0, 1/2], when v goes
from 0 to 1/2, the price of anarchy increases from 5/2 to 3, while the price of
stability decreases from 1 + 1/
√
3 to 1. In particular, the increase in the price
of anarchy is always compensated by a slightly higher decrease in the price of
stability.
For a vector V ∈ Vn, denote with v and v the maximum and minimum entry
in V , respectively. For the price of anarchy, by simply exploiting inequality (4),
we get the following dual program
minimize θ
subject to∑
i:e∈ki
(xi (Ke − v))−
∑
i:e∈oi
(xi (Ke + 1− v)) + θO2e ≥ K2e , ∀e ∈ E
xi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [n]
Theorem 11. For any n-player linear congestion game with altruistic social
context (G, Γ ) such that Γ = ΓV for some V ∈ Vn, it holds PoA(G, Γ ) ≤ 2−v1−v
when v ∈ [1/2, 1] and PoA(G, Γ ) ≤ 5+2v−3v2−v when v ∈ [0, 1/2].
Note that, for v = v, we reobtain the upper bounds already proved by Cara-
giannis et al. [8]. For the general case in which v > v, we have not been able to
achieve matching or almost matching lower bounds so far.
6 Conclusions
We have focused on the existence and inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria in
linear congestion games with altruistic social context in the spirit of the model
recently proposed by Keijzer et al. [13].
We have proved that pure Nash equilibria are always guaranteed to exist
when the matrix Γ defining the social context either has a unitary main diagonal
and is symmetric and that this result is tight in the sense that both properties
are essential as long as Γ does not obey other particular properties. In fact, for
the case in which Γ is such that γij = γi for each i, j with i 6= j, existence of pure
Nash equilibria can be proved although Γ neither has a unitary main diagonal
nor is symmetric. Thus, detecting other particular special cases for which such
an existential result could be provided is an interesting question.
We have also shown that the price of anarchy for general social contexts is
exactly 17/3 and that this bounds holds even for the case of load balancing
games. When compared with the results of Keijzer et al. [13], this gives rise to
two important questions. The first one is to determine the exact price of anarchy
of coarse correlated equilibria. Is this the same as the one of pure Nash equi-
libria, or is there a separation result, showing that when going from pure Nash
equilibria to coarse correlated equilibria, passing through mixed Nash equilibria
and correlated equilibria, at a certain point there must occur an increase in the
price of anarchy? The second one, is to determine the exact price of anarchy for
the basic case of load balancing games with identical resources.
As to the price of stability, instead, the main issue is to close the gap between
our upper bound of 2 and the lower bound of 1 + 1/
√
2. To this direction, our
intuition is that the upper bound is tight.
Finally, for the special case in which Γ is such that γij = γi for each i, j with
i 6= j, we have only given upper bounds on the price of anarchy. Matching or
nearly matching lower bounds, as well as bounds on the price of stability are
still missing.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Omitted Material from Section 3
Proof of Theorem 2. Let G be a linear congestion
game with 3 players and 13 resources such that S1 =
{{e1, e4, e13}, {e2, e3, e5, e6}}, S2 = {{e4, e5, e6, e9, e10, e13}, {e3, e7, e8}},
S3 = {{e1, e4, e5, e7, e10, e12}, {e6, e8, e11, e13}}, α1 = 9, α2 = 7, α3 = 16,
α4 = 25, α5 = 14, α6 = 32, α7 = 363, α8 = 87, α9 = 383, α10 = 318,
α11 = 1047, α12 = 160, α13 = 31 and βe = 0 for each e ∈ [13]. The matrix
Γ is such that γ11 = γ33 = 1, γ22 = 0, γ12 = γ21 =
10
211 , γ13 = γ31 =
2
53 and
γ23 = γ32 =
1
9 . Hence, Γ is symmetric, but the altruistic social context is not
restricted.
It is not difficult to check by inspection that each of the possible eight strategy
profiles is not a pure Nash equilibrium. To this aim, we use a triple (x1, x2, x3),
with xi ∈ {1, 2} for each i ∈ [3], to denote the strategy profile in which player
i chooses her first or second strategy depending on whether xi = 1 or xi = 2,
respectively. In the following table it is shown that no pure Nash equilibria exist
in (G, Γ ).
Profile S ĉ1(S) ĉ2(S) ĉ3(S) Migrating Player New Profile
(1, 1, 1) > 260 - - 1 (2, 1, 1)
(2, 1, 1) < 243 > 146 < 1398.87 2 (2, 2, 1)
(2, 2, 1) > 186.82 < 146 - 1 (1, 2, 1)
(1, 2, 1) < 186.82 - > 1381 3 (1, 2, 2)
(1, 2, 2) - > 150.66 < 1381 2 (1, 1, 2)
(1, 1, 2) > 244 < 150.65 - 1 (2, 1, 2)
(2, 1, 2) < 239 < 151 > 1398.88 3 (2, 1, 1)
(2, 2, 2) - > 151 - 2 (2, 1, 2)
Proof of Theorem 3. Let G be a linear congestion game with 3 players and 9
resources such that S1 = {{e3}, {e1, e2}}, S2 = {{e3, e6, e7}, {e2, e4, e5}}, S3 =
{{e3, e4, e7, e9}, {e5, e8}}, α1 = 10, α2 = 1, α3 = 4, α4 = 392, α5 = 98, α6 = 384,
α7 = 294, α8 = 1052, α9 = 160 and βe = 0 for each e ∈ [9]. The matrix Γ is
such that γij = 1 for each i, j ∈ [3] except for γ21 = γ32 = 0. Hence, (G, Γ ) is
a linear congestion game with restricted altruistic social context but Γ is not
symmetric.
It is not difficult to check by inspection that each of the possible eight strategy
profiles is not a pure Nash equilibrium. To this aim, we use a triple (x1, x2, x3),
with xi ∈ {1, 2} for each i ∈ [3], to denote the strategy profile in which player
i chooses her first or second strategy depending on whether xi = 1 or xi = 2,
respectively. In the following table it is shown that no pure Nash equilibria exist
in (G, Γ ).
Profile S ĉ1(S) ĉ2(S) ĉ3(S) Migrating Player New Profile
(1, 1, 1) 2148 - - 1 (2, 1, 1)
(2, 1, 1) 2139 2128 1159 2 (2, 2, 1)
(2, 2, 1) 2138 2126 - 1 (1, 2, 1)
(1, 2, 1) 2137 - 1254 3 (1, 2, 2)
(1, 2, 2) - 1837 1252 2 (1, 1, 2)
(1, 1, 2) 1844 1836 - 1 (2, 1, 2)
(2, 1, 2) 1843 1832 1161 3 (2, 1, 1)
(2, 2, 2) - 1838 - 2 (2, 1, 2)
7.2 Omitted Material from Section 4
Proof of Theorem 5.We use the notion of game graph introduced by Caragian-
nis et al. [7] to describe load balancing games in which each player has exactly
two possible strategies: the one played at the social optimum and the one played
at the worst pure Nash equilibrium. Each node in the graph models a resource,
while each edge {i, j} corresponds to a player who can only choose between one
of the two resources i and j.
We define a game graph T consisting in a tree having 2h+1 levels, numbered
from 0 to 2h. Level 0 corresponds to the root and level 2h to leaves. Each node
at level i, with 0 ≤ i ≤ h − 1, has three children, while each node at level i,
with h ≤ i ≤ 2h − 1, has two children. Hence, T is complete ternary tree of
height h whose leaves are the roots of complete binary trees of height h. This
implies that each level i, with 0 ≤ i ≤ h has 3i nodes, while each level i, with
h + 1 ≤ i ≤ 2h, has 3h2i−h nodes. The latency function of each node at level i
is of type αix, where αi =
(
3
7
)i
for each 0 ≤ i ≤ h − 1, αi = 35
(
3
7
)h−1 ( 2
5
)i−h
for each h ≤ i ≤ 2h − 1 and α2h = 65
(
6
35
)h−1
. The matrix Γ is defined as
follows: each player j = {u, v} such that u is the parent of v in T cares of the
player corresponding to the edge connecting node u to its parent (we call such
a player the parent of j, whenever it exists) and of all the players corresponding
to the edges connecting v to its children (we call these players the children of j,
whenever they exist). By “cares”, we mean that the corresponding entry in the
induced matrix Γ is 1, otherwise, it is 0. It is easy to see that Γ is a symmetric
boolean matrix.
We show that the strategy profile K in which each player selects the resource
closest to the root is a pure Nash equilibrium for (T, Γ ).
Consider a player j using a resource kj belonging to level i, with 0 ≤ i ≤
h − 2. Player j is sharing kj with her two siblings, thus cj(K) = 3
(
3
7
)i
. The
three children of player j are sharing the resource oj belonging to level i + 1,
thus each of them is paying a cost of 3
(
3
7
)i+1
. Finally, assume that the parent
of player j is paying a cost of δ (with δ = 0 when such a player does not
exist). It follows that ĉj(K) = 3
(
3
7
)i
+ 9
(
3
7
)i+1
+ δ = 487
(
3
7
)i
+ δ. If player
j migrates to the other strategy oj , thus joining her three children, her cost
becomes ĉj(K−j ⋄ oj) = 16
(
3
7
)i+1
+ δ = 487
(
3
7
)i
+ δ. Thus, player j has no
incentive to deviate from K.
Consider a player j using a resource kj belonging to level h− 1. Player j is
sharing kj with her two siblings, thus cj(K) = 3
(
3
7
)h−1
. The two children of
player j are sharing the resource oj belonging to level h, thus each of them is
paying a cost of 2 35
(
3
7
)h−1
. Finally, assume that the parent of player j is paying
a cost of δ. It follows that ĉj(K) = 3
(
3
7
)h−1
+ 125
(
3
7
)h−1
+ δ = 275
(
3
7
)h−1
+ δ.
If player j migrates to the other strategy oj , thus joining her two children, her
cost becomes ĉj(K−j ⋄ oj) = 275
(
3
7
)h−1
+ δ. Thus, player j has no incentive to
deviate from K.
Consider a player j using a resource kj belonging to level i, with h ≤ i ≤ 2h−
2. Player j is sharing kj with her sibling, thus cj(K) = 2
3
5
(
3
7
)h−1 ( 2
5
)i−h
. The
two children of player j are sharing the resource oj belonging to level i+1, thus
each of them is paying a cost of 2 35
(
3
7
)h−1 ( 2
5
)i−h+1
. Finally, assume that the
parent of player j is paying a cost of δ. It follows that ĉj(K) =
6
5
(
3
7
)h−1 ( 2
5
)i−h
+
12
5
(
3
7
)h−1 ( 2
5
)i−h+1
+ δ = 5425
(
3
7
)h−1 ( 2
5
)i−h
+ δ. If player j migrates to the other
strategy oj , thus joining her two children, her cost becomes ĉj(K−j ⋄ oj) =
9 35
(
3
7
)h−1 ( 2
5
)i−h+1
+ δ = 5425
(
3
7
)h−1 ( 2
5
)i−h
+ δ. Thus, player j has no incentive
to deviate from K.
Finally, consider a player j using a resource kj belonging to level 2h − 1.
Player j is sharing kj with her sibling, thus cj(K) = 2
3
5
(
6
35
)h−1
. Player j has
no children, thus assuming that her parent is paying a cost of δ, it follows that
ĉj(K) =
6
5
(
6
35
)h−1
+ δ. If player j migrates to the other strategy oj , used by no
players in K, her cost becomes ĉj(K−j ⋄ oj) = 65
(
6
35
)h−1
+ δ. Thus, player j has
no incentive to deviate from K.
In order to bound the value of SUM(K), note that each resource from level
0 to h− 1 is used by three players, while each resource from level h to 2h− 1 is
used by two players. Thus, we obtain
SUM(K) = 9
h−1∑
i=0
(
3i
(
3
7
)i)
+ 4
2h−1∑
i=h
(
3h2i−h
3
5
(
3
7
)h−1(
2
5
)i−h)
=
153
2
(
9
7
)h−1
− 36
5
(
36
35
)h−1
− 63
2
.
We upper bound the value of the social optimum with the social value of
the profile O in which all players choose the resource closest to the leaves. Note
that, in this case, each resource from level 1 to 2h is used by one player. Thus,
we obtain
SUM(O) =
h−1∑
i=1
(
3i
(
3
7
)i)
+
2h−1∑
i=h
(
3h2i−h
3
5
(
3
7
)h−1(
2
5
)i−h)
+ 6h
6
5
(
6
35
)h−1
=
27
2
(
9
7
)h−1
− 9
2
.
Hence, for any ǫ > 0, there exists a sufficiently big h such that
PoA(T, Γ ) ≥
153
2
(
9
7
)h−1
27
2
(
9
7
)h−1 − ǫ = 173 − ǫ.
Proof of Theorem 7. For any fixed ǫ > 0, G is defined as follows. The n players
are partitioned into three subsets P , P ′ and P ′′ such that |P | = |P ′| = n1 and
|P ′′| = n2 and there are 2(n21 + n1 + 1) resources. Each player i, with i ∈ P ,
has two strategies, denoted with ki and oi, each player i, with i ∈ P ′, has two
strategies, denoted with k′i and o
′
i, and each player i, with i ∈ P ′′, has a unique
strategy denoted with s. The resources are divided into six different types: there
are n1 resources of types A and B, denoted with Ai and Bi for each i ∈ [n1],
n21 resources of types C and D, denoted with Cij and Dij for each i, j ∈ [n1],
and 1 resource of types E and F . Resource Ai only belongs to oi for each i ∈ P ,
resource Bi only belongs to o
′
i for each i ∈ P ′, resource Cij belongs only to ki
and o′j for each i ∈ P and j ∈ P ′, resource Dij belongs only to k′i and oj for each
i ∈ P ′ and j ∈ P , resource E belongs only to s and to ki for each i ∈ P and
resource F belongs only to s and to k′i for each i ∈ P ′. Finally, each resource
of type A and B has latency ℓA(x) = ℓB(x) = (n1 + 2n2)x + δ, where δ > 0 is
arbitrarily small, each resource of type C and D has latency ℓC(x) = ℓD(x) =
x
2
and the resources of type E and F have latency ℓE(x) = ℓF (x) = 2x.
The matrix Γ is such that γii = 1 for each i ∈ [n], γij = 1 if and only if i ∈ P
and j ∈ P ′ or i ∈ P ′ and j ∈ P , while γij = 0 otherwise. Hence, Γ is a boolean
symmetric matrix which defines a restricted altruistic social context.
Note that the congestion of each resource of type C and D in any possible
strategy profile is a value in {0, 1, 2}. In particular, for any strategy profile S, it
holds
nCij(S) =

0 if i ∈ P chooses oi and j ∈ P ′ chooses k′j ,
2 if i ∈ P chooses ki and j ∈ P ′ chooses o′j ,
1 otherwise.
A similar characterization holds for nDij (S) by swapping the roles of the players
in P and P ′.
We show that the strategy profile K = ((ki)i∈P , (k′i)i∈P ′ , (s)i∈P ′′ ) is the
unique Nash equilibrium of (G, Γ ). Let H be any strategy profile in which exactly
h ≥ 1 players in P choose strategy k (and, so, n1 − h of them choose strategy
o) and exactly h′ ≥ 1 players in P ′ choose strategy k′ (and, so, n1 − h′ of them
choose strategy o′). Since the players are symmetric, as well as the resources, all
the players choosing the same type of strategy pay the same cost in H . Denote
with costk(H) the cost of any of the players in P choosing strategy k in H and
with costo(H) the cost of any of the players in P choosing strategy o in H .
Similarly, we denote with cost′k(H) the cost of any of the players in P
′ choosing
strategy k′ in H and with cost′o(H) the cost of any of the players in P ′ choosing
strategy o′ in H .
Let us compute costk(H). Without loss of generality, we can suppose that the
first h players in P and the first h′ players in P ′ are those choosing strategies
of types k and k′, respectively. Thus, we can focus on the cost paid by the
first player belonging to P in H . She is using resources C1j for each 1 ≤ j ≤
n1 and resource E. The congestion of the latter is n2 + h. By exploiting the
characterization of nCij (S) given above, we have that, of the n1 resources of
type C used by the player, n1 − h′ of them have congestion 2 (since there are
n1−h′ players in P ′ using the strategy of type o′) and h′ of them have congestion
1 (since there cannot be resources with congestion equal to 0). Thus, it holds
costk(H) =
1
2 (2n1 − h′) + 2(h+ n2).
Let us compute costo(H). Again, we can focus on the cost paid by the last
player belonging to P in H . She is using resources Din1 for each i ∈ [n1] and
resource An1 . The congestion of the latter is 1. By exploiting the characterization
of nDij (S) given above, we have that, of the n1 resources of type D used by the
player, h′ of them have congestion 2 (since there are h′ in P ′ using the strategy
of type k′) and n1−h′ of them have congestion 1 (since there cannot be resources
with congestion equal to 0). Thus, it holds costo(H) = n1+2n2+ δ+
1
2 (n1+h
′).
With a similar analysis, we obtain cost′k(H) =
1
2 (2n1 − h) + 2(h′ + n2) and
cost′o(H) = n1 + 2n2 + δ +
1
2 (n1 + h).
By the definition of Γ , each player in P wants to minimize her cost plus the
sum of the costs of all the players in P ′. Thus, we get
ĉostk(H) =
1
2
(2n1 − h′) + 2(h+ n2) + h′ · cost′k(H) + (n1 − h′) · cost′o(H)
and
ĉosto(H) = n1 + 2n2 + δ +
1
2
(n1 + h
′) + h′ · cost′k(H) + (n1 − h′) · cost′o(H).
Similarly, we obtain ĉost
′
k(H) and ĉost
′
o(H).
Let H1 be the strategy profile obtained from H when player i ∈ P changes
her strategy from ki to oi, i.e., the profile in which the number of player in
P using the strategy of type k is h − 1. Note that, as long as h ≤ h′, it holds
ĉostk(H) < ĉosto(H1). Similarly, it is possible to establish that, as long as h ≥ h′,
it holds ĉost
′
k(H) < ĉost
′
o(H2), where H2 is the strategy profile obtained from H
when player i ∈ P ′ changes her strategy from k′i to o′i, i.e., the profile in which
the number of player in P ′ using the strategy of type k′ is h′ − 1. Thus, in each
strategy profile H 6= K, there always exists a player using a strategy of type o
or o′ who can improve by choosing the strategy of type k or k′. This shows that
K is the only pure Nash equilibrium for (G, Γ ).
Let us now compare SUM(K) with SUM(O), where O =
((oi)i∈P , (o′i)i∈P ′ , (s)i∈P ′′). To this aim, note that each resource of type A
and B has congestion 0 in K and 1 in O, each resource of type C and D
has congestion 1 both in K and O and the resources of type E and F have
congestion n1 + n2 in K and n2 in O. Thus, we obtain
PoS(G, Γ ) = n
2
1 + 4(n1 + n2)
2
2n1 (n1 + 2n2 + δ) + n21 + 4n
2
2
.
By choosing n1 = 2(1 +
√
2)n2 and n2 sufficiently big, we get PoS(G, Γ ) ≥
1 + 1/
√
2− ǫ.
7.3 Omitted Material from Section 5
Proof of Theorem 9. For v ∈ [0, 1/2], set θ = (
√
3+1)(1−v)√
3−v(√3−1) , x =
3−2(1+√3)v2−(3−√3)v
2(2v2−6v+3) and yi =
2(1+
√
3)v2−(1+3√3)v+√3
2v2−6v+3 for each i ∈ [n]. With
these values, the dual constraint becomes (2v − 1)f(Ke, Oe) ≥ 0, with
f(Ke, Oe) := K
2
e ((
√
3− 1)v + 3− 2
√
3)−Ke(2Oe −
√
3)((1 +
√
3)v −
√
3)
+Oe(Oe − 1)((5 + 3
√
3)v − 3− 2
√
3)
which, for any v ∈ [0, 1/2], is non-negative when f(Ke, Oe) ≤ 0. Note that the
discriminant of the equation f(Ke, Oe) = 0, when solved for Ke, is
v2(18(2+
√
3)− (32+ 16√3)Oe) + v((48+16
√
3)Oe − 18(3+
√
3))− 3(8Oe− 9).
Such a quantity is always non-positive when Oe ≥ 2, hence we are just left to
check the cases of Oe ∈ {0, 1}. For Oe = 0, f(Ke, Oe) ≤ 0 becomes
Ke(v((
√
3− 1)Ke + 3 +
√
3) + (3− 2√3)Ke − 3) ≤ 0
which is always verified when Ke ≥
√
3(
√
3−(1+√3)v)
(
√
3−1)v+3−2√3 . Since the right-hand side
of this inequality is never positive for any v ∈ [0, 1/2], we are done. For Oe = 1,
f(Ke, Oe) ≤ 0 becomes
Ke(v((
√
3− 1)Ke + 1−
√
3) + (3− 2
√
3)Ke + 2
√
3− 3) ≤ 0
which is always verified for any non-negative integer Ke.
For v ∈ [1/2, 1], set θ = 3−
√
3−2v(2−√3)
2(1−v) , x =
1+2v−√3(2v−1)
4(1−v) and yi =
(2v−1)(√3−1)
2(1−v) for each i ∈ [n]. (Note that, for v = 1, the variables θ, x and
yi are not correctly defined. In fact, in such a case, the price of stability is un-
bounded which implies that the dual program is unfeasible). With these values,
the dual constraint becomes 1−2v
v−1 f(Ke, Oe) ≥ 0, with
f(Ke, Oe) := K
2
e (1+
√
3)−Ke(2Oe(
√
3−1)+1+√3)+Oe(Oe(3
√
3−5)+3−√3)
which, for any v ∈ [1/2, 1], is non-negative when f(Ke, Oe) ≥ 0. Note that the
discriminant of the equation f(Ke, Oe) = 0, when solved for Ke, is
4Oe(1−
√
3) + 2 +
√
3.
Such a quantity is always non-positive when Oe ≥ 2, hence we are just left to
check the cases of Oe ∈ {0, 1}. For Oe = 0, f(Ke, Oe) ≥ 0 becomes
Ke(Ke − 1) ≥ 0
which is always verified for any non-negative integerKe. For Oe = 1, f(Ke, Oe) ≥
0 becomes
Ke(1 +
√
3)−Ke(3
√
3− 1) + 2
√
3− 2 ≥ 0
which is always verified for any non-negative integer Ke.
Proof of Theorem 10. For any fixed ǫ > 0 and v ∈ [0, 1/2], G is defined
as follows. The n players are partitioned into two subsets P and P ′ such that
|P | = n1 and |P ′| = n2 and there are n21+1 resources. Each player i, with i ∈ P ,
has two strategies, denoted with ki and oi, while each player in P
′ has a unique
strategy denoted with s. The resources are divided into three different types:
there are n1 resources of type A, denoted with Ai for each i ∈ [n1], n1(n1 − 1)
resources of type B, denoted with Bij for each i, j ∈ [n1] with i 6= j, and 1
resource of type C. Resource Ai only belongs to oi for each i ∈ P , resource Bij
belongs only to ki and oj for each i, j ∈ P with i 6= j and resource C belongs
only to s and to ki for each i ∈ P . Finally, each resource of type A has latency
ℓA(x) =
n1+2n2+1−2v
2(1−v) x+δ, where δ > 0 is arbitrarily small, each resource of type
B has latency ℓB(x) =
x
2 and the resources of type C has latency ℓC(x) = x.
Note that the congestion of each resource of type B in any possible strategy
profile is a value in {0, 1, 2}. In particular, for any strategy profile S, it holds
nBij (S) =

0 if i chooses oi and j chooses kj ,
2 if i chooses ki and j chooses oj ,
1 otherwise.
We show that the strategy profile K = ((ki)i∈P , (s)i∈P ′) is the unique Nash
equilibrium of (G, Γ ). Let H be any strategy profile in which exactly h ≥ 1
players in P choose strategy k (and, so, n1−h of them choose strategy o). Since
the players are symmetric, as well as the resources, all the players choosing the
same type of strategy pay the same cost in H . Denote with costk(H) the cost of
any of the players in P choosing strategy k in H and with costo(H) the cost of
any of the players in P choosing strategy o in H .
Let us compute costk(H). Without loss of generality, we can suppose that
the first h players in P are those choosing strategies of type k. Thus, we can
focus on the cost paid by the first player belonging to P in H . She is using
resources B1j for each 1 ≤ j ≤ n1 with j 6= 1 and resource C. The congestion of
the latter is n2 + h. By exploiting the characterization of nBij (S) given above,
we have that, of the n1 − 1 resources of type B used by the player, n1 − h of
them have congestion 2 (since there are n1 − h players in P using the strategy
of type o) and h− 1 of them have congestion 1 (since there cannot be resources
with congestion equal to 0). Thus, it holds costk(H) =
1
2 (2n1 − h− 1) + h+ n2.
Let us compute costo(H). Again, we can focus on the cost paid by the last
player belonging to P in H . She is using resources Bin1 for each i ∈ [n1− 1] and
resource An1 . The congestion of the latter is 1. By exploiting the characterization
of nBij (S) given above, we have that, of the n1 − 1 resources of type B used
by the player, h of them have congestion 2 (since there are h players in P using
the strategy of type k) and n1 − h − 1 of them have congestion 1 (since there
cannot be resources with congestion equal to 0). Thus, it holds costo(H) =
n1+2n2+1−2v
2(1−v) + δ +
1
2 (n1 + h− 1).
By the definition of Γ , each player in P wants to minimize (1− v) times her
cost plus the sum of the costs of all the players in the game multiplied by v.
Thus, we get
ĉostk(H)
= (1− v)costk(H) + v ((h− 1)costk(H) + (n1 − h)costo(H) + n2(n2 + h))
and
ĉosto(H)
= (1− v)costo(H) + v (h · costk(H) + (n1 − h− 1)costo(H) + n2(n2 + h)) .
Let H ′ be the strategy profile obtained from H when a player i ∈ P changes
her strategy from ki to oi, i.e., the profile in which the number of players in P
using the strategy of type k is h − 1. Note that it holds ĉostk(H) < ĉosto(H ′).
Thus, in each strategy profile H 6= K, there always exists a player using a
strategy of type o who can improve by choosing the strategy of type k. This
shows that K is the only pure Nash equilibrium for (G, Γ ).
Let us now compare SUM(K) with SUM(O), where O = ((oi)i∈P , (s)i∈P ′ ).
To this aim, note that each resource of type A has congestion 0 in K and 1 in
O, each resource of type B has congestion 1 both in K and O and the resource
of type C has congestion n1 + n2 in K and n2 in O. Thus, we obtain
PoS(G, Γ ) =
1
2n1(n1 − 1) + (n1 + n2)2(
n1+2n2+1−2v
2(1−v) + δ
)
n+ 12n1(n1 − 1) + n22
.
By choosing n1 = (1 +
√
3)n2 and n2 sufficiently big, we get PoS(G, Γ ) ≥
(
√
3+1)(1−v)√
3−v(√3−1) − ǫ.
For any fixed ǫ > 0 and v ∈ [1/2, 1], G′ is defined as follows. The n players
are partitioned into two subsets P and P ′ such that |P | = n1 and |P ′| = n2 and
there are n21+1 resources. Each player i, with i ∈ P , has two strategies, denoted
with ki and oi, while each player in P
′ has a unique strategy denoted with s. The
resources are divided into three different types: there are n1 resources of type
A, denoted with Ai for each i ∈ [n1], n1(n1 − 1) resources of type B, denoted
with Bij for each i, j ∈ [n1] with i 6= j, and 1 resource of type C. Resource Ai
only belongs to ki for each i ∈ P , resource Bij belongs only to ki and oj for each
i, j ∈ P with i 6= j and resource C belongs only to s and to oi for each i ∈ P .
Finally, each resource of type A has latency ℓA(x) =
n1+2n2+1−2v
2(1−v) x − δ, where
δ > 0 is arbitrarily small, each resource of type B has latency ℓB(x) =
x
2 and
the resources of type C has latency ℓC(x) = x.
Note that the congestion of each resource of type B in any possible strategy
profile is a value in {0, 1, 2}. In particular, for any strategy profile S, it holds
nBij (S) =

0 if i chooses oi and j chooses kj ,
2 if i chooses ki and j chooses oj ,
1 otherwise.
We show that the strategy profile K = ((ki)i∈P , (s)i∈P ′) is the unique Nash
equilibrium of (G, Γ ). Let H be any strategy profile in which exactly h ≥ 1
players in P choose strategy k (and, so, n1−h of them choose strategy o). Since
the players are symmetric, as well as the resources, all the players choosing the
same type of strategy pay the same cost in H . Denote with costk(H) the cost of
any of the players in P choosing strategy k in H and with costo(H) the cost of
any of the players in P choosing strategy o in H .
Let us compute costk(H). Without loss of generality, we can suppose that the
first h players in P are those choosing strategies of type k. Thus, we can focus
on the cost paid by the first player belonging to P in H . She is using resources
B1j for each 1 ≤ j ≤ n1 with j 6= 1 and resource A1. The congestion of the latter
is 1. By exploiting the characterization of nBij (S) given above, we have that, of
the n1−1 resources of type B used by the player, n1−h of them have congestion
2 (since there are n1 − h players in P using the strategy of type o) and h− 1 of
them have congestion 1 (since there cannot be resources with congestion equal
to 0). Thus, it holds costk(H) =
n1+2n2+1−2v
2(1−v) − δ + 12 (2n1 − h− 1).
Let us compute costo(H). Again, we can focus on the cost paid by the last
player belonging to P in H . She is using resources Bin1 for each i ∈ [n1 − 1]
and resource C. The congestion of the latter is n1 − h + n2. By exploiting the
characterization of nBij (S) given above, we have that, of the n1 − 1 resources
of type B used by the player, h of them have congestion 2 (since there are h
players in P using the strategy of type k) and n1−h−1 of them have congestion
1 (since there cannot be resources with congestion equal to 0). Thus, it holds
costo(H) =
1
2 (n1 + h− 1) + n1 − h+ n2.
By the definition of Γ , each player in P wants to minimize (1− v) times her
cost plus the sum of the costs of all the players in the game multiplied by v.
Thus, we get
ĉostk(H)
= (1 − v)costk(H) + v ((h− 1)costk(H) + (n1 − h)costo(H) + n2(n1 − h+ n2))
and
ĉosto(H)
= (1 − v)costo(H) + v (h · costk(H) + (n1 − h− 1)costo(H) + n2(n1 − h+ n2)) .
Let H ′ be the strategy profile obtained from H when a player i ∈ P changes
her strategy from ki to oi, i.e., the profile in which the number of players in P
using the strategy of type k is h − 1. Note that it holds ĉostk(H) < ĉosto(H ′).
Thus, in each strategy profile H 6= K, there always exists a player using a
strategy of type o who can improve by choosing the strategy of type k. This
shows that K is the only pure Nash equilibrium for (G, Γ ).
Let us now compare SUM(K) with SUM(O), where O = ((oi)i∈P , (s)i∈P ′ ).
To this aim, note that each resource of type A has congestion 1 in K and 0 in
O, each resource of type B has congestion 1 both in K and O and the resource
of type C has congestion n2 in K and n1 + n2 in O. Thus, we obtain
PoS(G′, Γ ′) =
(
n1+2n2+1−2v
2(1−v) − δ
)
n+ 12n1(n1 − 1) + n22
1
2n1(n1 − 1) + (n1 + n2)2
.
By choosing n1 = (1 +
√
3)n2 and n2 sufficiently big, we get PoS(G′, Γ ′) ≥
3−√3−2v(2−√3)
2(1−v) − ǫ.
Proof of Theorem 11. For v ∈ [1/2, 1], consider the dual solution such that
θ = 2−v1−v and xi =
1
1−v for each i ∈ [n]. (Note that, for v = 1, xi and θ are
not correctly defined. In fact, in such a case, the price of anarchy is unbounded
which implies that the dual program is unfeasible). With these values, for each
e ∈ E, the dual constraint becomes
vOe(Oe − 1) + vKe(1−Ke) +Oe(Ke − 2Oe + 1) ≤ 0.
For Oe = 0, such an inequality becomes vKe(Ke − 1) ≥ 0 which is always
verified for any non negative integer Ke when v ≥ 0, while, for Oe = 1, it
becomes vKe(Ke− 2)−Ke+1 ≥ 0 which is always verified for any non negative
integer Ke when v ≥ 12 .
For Oe ≥ 2, the discriminant of the equation associated with the dual con-
strained, when solved for Ke, is
4vvOe(Oe − 1) + v2 + 2vOe(3− 4Oe) +O2e
which is non-positive when it holds
v2(4O2e − 4Oe + 1) + 2vOe(3− 4Oe) +O2e ≤ 0.
Such an inequality is verified for any
v ∈
Oe
(
4Oe − 3− 2
√
3O2e − 5Oe + 2
)
4O2e − 4Oe + 1
,
Oe
(
4Oe − 3 + 2
√
3O2e − 5Oe + 2
)
4O2e − 4Oe + 1
 .
Since, for any Oe ≥ 2, such an interval is contained in the interval
[
2
9 , 1 +
√
3
2
]
,
the proposed dual solution is feasible.
For v ∈ [0, 1/2], consider the dual solution such that θ = 5+2v−3v2−v and xi =
3
2−v for each i ∈ [n]. With these values, for each e ∈ E, the dual constraint
becomes
3vOe(Oe − 1)− v(K2e − 3Ke + 2O2e)−K2e + 3KeOe −Oe(5Oe − 3) ≤ 0.
For Oe = 0, such an inequality becomes K
2
e + vKe(Ke − 3) ≥ 0 which is always
verified for any non negative integer Ke when v ≤ 12 , while, for Oe = 1, it
becomes (1+ v)(K2e − 3Ke+2) ≥ 0 which is always verified for any non negative
integer Ke when v ≥ 0.
For Oe ≥ 2, the discriminant of the equation associated with the dual con-
strained, when solved for Ke, is
12v(1 + v)Oe(Oe − 1) + v2(9 − 8O2e) + 2vOe(15− 14Oe)−Oe(11Oe − 12)
which is non-positive when it holds
v2(4O2e − 12Oe + 9) + 2vOe(9− 8Oe)−Oe(11Oe − 12) ≤ 0.
For Oe ≥ 2, the quantity −Oe(11Oe − 12) is always negative, hence, in order to
show the validity of the above inequality, we only need to prove that
v2(4O2e − 12Oe + 9) + 2vOe(9− 8Oe) ≤ 0.
Such an inequality is always verified when v ≤ 16O2e−18Oe4O2e−12Oe+9 . Since, for Oe ≥ 2,
the right-hand side of this inequality is lower bounded by 4, the proposed dual
solution is feasible.
